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I. INTRODUCTION 
New Jersey’s public pension system is on the brink of disaster.  
The state, its employees, and taxpayers face a crisis as the state’s 
pension liability exceeded $40 billion in 2015, and the funding 
ratio of the state’s pension systems fell to 51.5%.1  According to 
Moody’s Investors Service, the unfunded liability in 2016 is $55 
billion.2  New Jersey’s pension system reached its current precipice 
due to chronic underfunding of the system by the state.  In fact, New 
Jersey’s annual average contribution over the past seven years is 
13.5%, the lowest in the nation.3 
The state’s chronic underfunding of the pension system 
continues despite comprehensive pension reforms passed in 2011.  
The 2011 reforms resulted in bi-partisan legislation, whereby the 
state promised to fund the pension systems in exchange for a 
reduction of benefits and elimination of cost of living increases for 
public employees.4  A reduction of pension benefits, when 
combined with underfunded pensions systems, victimizes public 
employees.  The vast majority of public employees do not qualify 
for the federal Social Security system, and resultantly have limited 
guaranteed retirement income outside of their pension benefits.5  
The status of New Jersey’s pension system has been exacerbated by 
the 2008 financial crisis, which hindered the United States economy 
and damaged nearly every public pension system in the nation.  The 
financial crisis identified a consistent issue that faces public 
pensions: when the economy is doing well and state revenues are 
high, pension funds usually enjoy strong investment returns and 
 
 1  Samantha Marcus, N.J. Public Worker Pension Fund Gap Widens to $40B, NJ.COM 
(Apr. 23, 2015, 5:40 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/04/nj_pension 
_fund_gap_widens_to_40b.html [hereinafter N.J. Public Worker]. 
 2  Samantha Marcus, Losing Pension Court Case Could Cost N.J. Big, Moody’s Warns, 
NJ.COM (January 21 2016), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/01/losing_ 
state_supreme_court_pension_case_could_cost.html.  Moody’s noted that under 
different accounting standards, the unfunded liability measures as high as $113 billion.  
The liability could also increase by 30%, as the New Jersey Supreme Court rules that 
state and local governments must restore retirees’ cost-of-living increases.  State 
employees are seeking reinstatement of cost-of-living increases in Berg v. Christie, which 
was heard by the NJ Supreme Court in March 2016.  
 3  Id.  
 4  Details of N.J. Public Worker Pension and Health Benefits Reform Bill, NJ.COM (June 
23, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2011/06/details_of_nj_ 
public_worker_pe.html.  
 5  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-322, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
PENSION PLANS: ECONOMIC DOWNTURN SPURS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS COSTS AND 
SUSTAINABILITY 5 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590/589043.pdf. 
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thus have relatively low contribution needs.6  Conversely, when the 
economy is performing poorly, state revenues decrease, social needs 
increase, and pension funds experience losses, necessitating larger 
contributions to offset the shortfall.7 
In response to gross underfunding of the pension system, state 
employees filed suit against the State of New Jersey seeking relief 
from Governor Chris Christie’s failure to satisfy the contribution 
obligations of N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(a)–(b).  In Burgos v. State of New 
Jersey, the Supreme Court of New Jersey rendered a controversial 
ruling that alarmed state employees and state legislators concerned 
with the solvency of the pension systems.9  The court found that 
despite clear evidence of the legislature’s intent to create a contract 
requiring the state to contribute certain annual payments to the 
pension systems, the 2011 Pension Reform Act did not create a 
contractual relationship, and, therefore, the state is not required to 
satisfy the obligations specified in the 2011 reforms.10  The court’s 
decision undermined the trust of the public employees and led to a 
call for immediate reform to alleviate the distressing position of the 
state’s pension liabilities.  
This Note discusses New Jersey’s pension systems and frames 
practical solutions that could alleviate the state’s alarming unfunded 
pension liabilities.  Part II of this Note provides a historical overview 
of New Jersey’s pension system, including an analysis of state 
jurisprudence on pension laws.  Part III analyzes the New Jersey 
Legislature’s proposed constitutional amendment, its current status, 
and if passed, the effect of the amendment on the state’s pension 
obligations.  Part IV compares New Jersey’s pension system to those 
of other states with broader constitutional protections for state 
contributions to public pensions.  Part V suggests practical solutions 
to the state’s pension crisis and provides a discussion of those 
solutions with Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo and Assemblyman 
Jack Ciattarelli. 
 
 6  Amy B. Monahan, State Fiscal Constitutions and the Law and Politics of Public 
Pensions, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 130 (citing U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra 
note 5).  
 7  Id. at 130.  
 9  Burgos v. State of New Jersey, 118 A.3d 270, 274 (2015).  
 10  Id.  
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II. NEW JERSEY’S PENSION SYSTEM 
A. Overview 
The vast majority of state governments provide defined-benefit 
pension plans to state employees.11  In defined-benefit pension 
plans, employees receive an annual monetary and healthcare 
benefit upon retirement.12  In exchange for the annual retirement 
benefit, employees contribute a portion of their salary each year to 
the pension fund, which is then invested by the state.13  This system 
places the investment risk in the hands of the employer, the state of 
New Jersey, which is responsible for paying the annual benefits to 
retirees.14  Critically, if the pension fund does not accrue at a rate 
large enough to cover the pension benefits promised to retirees, the 
state is obligated to cover the difference.15 
Unlike many public sector and state pension plans, most 
private sector employers utilize defined-contribution plans such as 
the 401(k) or 403(b).16  Defined-contribution plans do not 
guarantee retirees a specific benefit, but rather, the employees 
withdraw their retirement funds at their own discretion.17  The 
employee’s retirement account is funded through employee salary 
contributions, employer contributions, and performance of the 
pension investments, and, with this plan, employees determine the 
amount of their contribution to an individual pension account, 
with the employer providing a matching contribution.18  The 
employee is responsible for management of the pension fund and 
makes his or her own investment decisions.19  Additionally, federal 
 
 11  Kellogg Insight, Pensions in Peril: The Funding Status of State-Sponsored Pension 
Plans (Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://insight.kellogg.northwestern.edu/article/ 
pensions_in_peril.  
 12  Id.  
 13  Anthony Randazzo, Pension Reform Case Study: Michigan, Policy Study No. 434, 
REASON FOUNDATION 12  (Mar. 2014), http://reason.org/files/pension _reform_ 
michigan.pdf.  
 14  Id. 
 15  Id. 
 16  Id.  
 17  See id. There are tax implications depending on when the employee withdraws 
funds from their account. See What are Defined-Contribution Retirement Plans?, TAX 
POLICY CENTER, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-defined-
contribution-retirement-plans (last visited May 17, 2016). 
 18  Randazzo, supra note 13.  The matching contribution is generally capped a 
specified percentage.  If an employee contributes in excess of the specified percentage, 
the State/employer is not obligated to match the contribution beyond the specified 
cap. See, e.g., Randazzo, supra note 13, at 15. 
 19  Randazzo, supra note 13, at 12.  Defined-benefit plan investments are managed 
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regulations stipulate that defined-contribution plans achieve 100% 
funding or address underfunding within specified periods of time, 
thereby insulating the system from the underfunding issues present 
in defined-benefit plans.20  Once the employer provides the 
applicable contribution, the employer has no additional obligations 
to the employee’s pension fund.21 
New Jersey utilizes a defined-benefit pension plan whereby 
participants are guaranteed a calculable amount of benefits payable 
upon retirement.22  New Jersey utilizes five primary pension systems 
for retired employees: (1) the Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(“PERS”); (2) the State Police Retirement System (“SPRS”); (3) the 
Police and Fireman’s Retirement System (“PFRS”); (4) the Teachers’ 
Pension and Annuities Fund (“TPAF”); and (5) the Judicial 
Retirement System (“JRS”).23  In 2013, there were 400,452 
employees participating in state pension plans.24  New Jersey’s 
pension and retirement program provides state employees a non-
forfeitable right to receive benefits through N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(a)–
(b).25  N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(a)–(b) stipulates that the participants in 
the pension and retirement systems are entitled to calculable 
benefits which cannot be reduced once the right to the benefit has 
attached.26  The benefits of the pension system are paid using 
revenues from employee contributions, public employer 
contributions, and investment returns.27  The question continually 
presented to legislators, pensioners, taxpayers, and the New Jersey 
 
by the employer. See What's the Difference Between a Defined Benefit Plan and a Defined 
Contribution Plan?, CNN MONEY, 
http://money.cnn.com/retirement/guide/pensions_ basics.moneymag/index3.htm 
(last visited May 17, 2016).  
 20 Alicia H. Munnell and Mauricio Soto, State and Local Pensions are Different from 
Private Plans, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE, 5 (Nov. 2007), 
http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2007/11/slp_1.pdf. 
 21  Randazzo, supra note 13.  
 22  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 274 (noting the benefit to which participants are entitled is 
determined based on their final average salary and years of service).  
 23  See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:15a-1–161 (West 2016) (enacting PERS); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. §§ 53:5A-1–47 (West 2016) (establishing SPRS); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:16-1–21 
(West 2016) (enacting PFRS); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:18A:66-1–93 (West 2015) (creating 
TPAF in its present form); and N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 43:6A-1–47 (West 2016) (enacting 
JRS).  
 24  N.J. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE, STATUS REPORT OF THE NEW 
JERSEY PENSION AND HEALTH BENEFIT STUDY COMMISSION 10 (September 25, 2014) 
[hereinafter TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE]. 
 25  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 274.  
 26  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:3C-9.5(a)–(b) (West 2016). 
 27  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 274.  
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judiciary, is what benefits state employees are guaranteed under 
N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(a)–(b), and whether the state legislature can 
enact reforms which alter and, in some instances, diminish the 
benefits to which state employees are entitled.  The New Jersey 
judiciary evaluates this question through a series of previous 
decisions, beginning with the Spina v. Consolidated Police & Fireman’s 
Fund in 1964.28 
i. Spina v. Consolidated Police & Fireman’s Fund 
Spina was a precedential ruling by the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey that shaped the future of challenges to funding of the pension 
systems.  In Spina, members of the police and fireman’s pension 
plans challenged N.J.S.A. § 43:16-1, which was amended to increase 
the retirement age to 51 and the minimum years of service to 25.29  
Prior to the amendment, police and fire department pensioners 
were entitled to benefits at age 50 and after 20 years of service.30  The 
Spina plaintiffs argued that because the legislative enactment 
increased the retirement age and minimum years of service, it 
violated their contractual right to retirement benefits and was 
therefore constitutionally invalid.31  This position is based on the 
argument that an increase to the  retirement age and minimum years 
of service materially alters the benefits of police and fire pensioners.  
The Spina court disagreed, citing a history of case law where New 
Jersey courts had held that “the Legislature may revise pension plans 
which governmental employees are required to join.”32  Of 
particular significance, the court’ found that “the terms and 
conditions of public service in office or employment rest in 
legislative policy rather than contractual obligation, and hence may 
be changed except, of course insofar as the State Constitution 
specifically provides otherwise.”33  Thus, the Spina court established 
that the state pension systems do not create a contractual agreement 
between state employees and the legislature, entitling state 
 
 28  Spina v. Consolidated Police & Fireman’s Fund, 197 A.2d 169 (1964). 
 29  Spina, 197 A.2d at 393.  
30 Id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:16-1 (West 2016).  The Police and Fire Pension Fund 
statute was amended in 2001, raising the retirement age to 60 years for police officers, 
65 years for firemen, and 70 years for fire department employees.  The minimum 
years of service remains 25 years for all members of the Police and Fire Pension Fund. 
Id. 
 31  Spina, 197 A.2d at 393.  
 32  Id. at 398 (citing Laden v. Daley, 132 N.J.L. 440 (Sup. Ct. 1945); Bader v. Crone, 
116 N.J.L. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1936); Bennett v. Lee, 104 N.J.L. 453 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Barnett 
v. Pension Comm’n &c., 100 N.J. Eq. 473 (Ch. 1927)). 
 33  Spina, 197 A.2d at 399.  
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employees to fixed pension benefits.34  This created a concern for 
public employees: if there is no contract guaranteeing that the 
legislature will not alter their benefits, what benefits are guaranteed?  
The answer to this question, according to the Spina court, is that 
pension benefits are not black and white, but rather fall within a 
gray area subject to the discretion of the state legislature.35 
ii. New Jersey Education Association v. State of New Jersey36 
The Spina case addressed part one of the pension question: 
whether state employees’ rights are violated when the legislature 
enacts changes to the benefits retirees are entitled to receive.  The 
NJEA case identified the second question in the fight for public 
pensions: are pensioner’s rights violated if the pension system is not 
adequately funded?37  In NJEA, the court noted that Spina “did not 
address the precise question of whether the plaintiffs had a 
contractually enforceable interest in future contributions to ensure 
the ongoing fiscal integrity of the pension system.”“38  However, the 
NJEA court relied on the holding in Spina, that “traditional contract 
rights do not apply in the realm of public pensions,” and 
emphasized that the statutory language of N.J.S.A. § 18A:66-18(d) 
did not create a contract which bound the legislature to provide 
annual contributions.39  This conclusion was derived from the New 
Jersey Constitution’s Appropriations Clause and the Debt 
Limitations Clause, which “grant our Legislature sweeping and 
exclusive powers of appropriation and preclude one Legislature from 
binding future legislatures with respect to prospective appropriations.”40  
Ultimately, the NJEA decision reaffirmed that public pensions do 
not create an enforceable contract right, insulated from alteration or 
reform, and established that state employees do not have right to 
systematic funding of their pension fund.41 
Both the Spina and NJEA decisions, while founded on sound 
 
 34  Id.  
 35  Id. at 403.  
 36  New Jersey Educ. Ass’n v. State, 412 N.J. Super. 192 (App. Div. 2010). 
 37  NJEA, 412 N.J. Super. 192 at 210–11.  
 38  Id.  
 39  Id. at 212–13. 
 40  Id. at 212 (citing City of Camden v. Byrne, 82 N.J. 133, 151–54 (1980)) 
(emphasis added).  
 41  Id. at 215.  The court stressed the distinction between an employee’s non-
forfeitable right to receive benefits, and the funding method adopted to assure payment 
of those benefits. Id.  The non-forfeitable right to benefits that have already attached 
(vested) cannot be reduced, nor can their receipt be denied. Id. 
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legal principles, provided an outlet for the State of New Jersey to 
ignore the pension promises made to it’s state employees.  The 
unintended effects of these decisions are felt by legislators, state 
employees, and tax-payers, culminating in the precarious position 
facing us today. 
B. State of the Pension System 
The state of New Jersey’s pension system is dire.  According to 
a study by the National Association of State Retirement 
Administrators, New Jersey’s record of funding its pension system is 
the worst in the country.42  Pension system funding is evaluated by 
comparing the amount a state contributes to the system against the 
Annual Required Contribution (“ARC”).  From 2001 to 2013, New 
Jersey averaged 38% of the ARC.43  Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
were the only states in the nation to average less than 50%.44  All 
but six states contributed at least 75% of their ARC.45  Additionally, 
the funded ratio of New Jersey’s pension has decreased each year 
since 2003.46  In 2003, New Jersey’s pension systems were 93.5% 
funded.47  In 2013, New Jersey’s pension systems were 62.8% 
funded.48  The funding ratio fell to 51.5% in 2015.49  According to 
Moody’s Investors Service, the unfunded liability in 2016 is $55 
billion.50  New Jersey’s annual average contribution over the past 
seven years is 13.5%, the lowest in the nation.51 
To place those numbers in perspective, if New Jersey’s system 
was funded at the same rate as 2003, the liability would be 
approximately $9 billion.52  In an effort to address the fiscal health 
 
 42  Keith Brainard and Alex Brown, Spotlight on the Annual Required Contribution 
Experience of State Retirement Plans, FY 01 to FY 13, NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE RETIREMENT 
ADMIN.’S (Mar. 2015).  
 43  Id. at 8.  
 44  Id. 
 45  Samantha Marcus, NJ Pension System Most Underfunded of All 50 States, NJ.COM 
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/03/nj_pension_system_ 
most_underfunded_of_all_50_state.html.  
 46  The Fiscal Health of State Pension Plans, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 31, 2015), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2015/the-fiscal-health-
of-state-pension-plans.  
 47  Id. 
 48  Id.  
 49  See N.J. Public Worker, supra note 1.  
 50  Samantha Marcus, Losing Pension Court Case Could Cost N.J. Big, Moody’s Warns, 
NJ.COM (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/01/losing_state 
_supreme_court_pension_case_could_cost.html.  
 51  Id.  
 52  The Fiscal Health of State Pension Plans, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 31, 2015), 
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of the pension system resulting from the State’s conduct following 
each of the decisions, the Christie administration, the state 
legislature, and state employee union’s negotiated and enacted 
significant reforms in 2011. 
C. Chapter 78–2011 Pension Amendment 
In 2011, N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c) was amended by the New 
Jersey Legislature in response to increasing unfunded liabilities of 
the state’s retirement system and pension funds.53  The Amendment 
increased employees’ contributions to the funds and enhanced the 
eligibility requirements for new members.54  Additionally, the 
Amendment indefinitely suspended cost of living adjustments 
(“COLAs”) for both current and future retirees.55  In exchange for 
the increased contributions and suspension of COLAs, the 2011 
Amendment introduced terms that required that the state make 
certain annual contributions to the pension funds, addressing the 
unfunded liabilities and restoring the funds to “fiscally sound 
levels.”56  Additionally, the Amendments added language which 
explicitly declared “the existence of a contractual right in pension-
system members,” and set forth ”that the state employers’ failure to 
comply with the full-contribution requirement is ‘deemed’ an 
impairment of that right as to each member, that either members or 
the trustees of the Funds themselves could enforce.”57 
The 2011 Amendment was a by-product of years of 
underfunding the pension system and demands for reform.  
Legislators balanced the interests of the retirees who spent their 
working careers contributing to the pension system, and who are 
statutorily entitled to their benefits, against the tax burden on New 
Jersey’s taxpayers, who would foot the bill to ensure the solvency of 
the pension system.58  The state of the pension system emerged from 
 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2015/the-fiscal-health-
of-state-pension-plans (calculating New Jersey’s total pension liability at 
approximately $137 billion).  
 53  See Pension and Health Benefits Reform, STATE OF NEW JERSEY DEP’T OF TREASURY, 
available at http://www.state.nj.us/treasury/pensions/reform-2011.shtml (last visited 
May 17, 2016).  
 54  N.J. STAT. ANN. §. 43:3C-9.5(c) (West 2016). 
 55  2011 N.J. ALS 78 (2011) (amending N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:3B-2).  
 56  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 274.  
 57  Id. at 276. 
 58  Adam J. Elias, A Simple Suggestion for Substantial Protection: Amending the New 
Jersey Constitution to Create Contractual Rights For Public Employees to Their Pension 
Benefits, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 89, 91 (2013) (citing Jarrett Renshaw, A Historic Defeat for State 
Unions in Victory for Christie, Assembly Backs Cuts to Benefits and Pensions, STAR-LEDGER 
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years of underfunding by the state, poor returns during the 2008 
recession, and an unprecedented number of retirees participating in 
the system.59 
Despite the startling figures above, New Jersey’s pension system 
shows little sign of improvement under the current gubernatorial 
administration.  Governor Christie contributed $484 million in 
2012, $1 billion in 2013, $696 million in 2014, and $681 million 
in 2015 to the state’s pension systems.60  While these payments 
exceed the aggregate amounts of the previous gubernatorial 
administrations, the payments fall well below the ARC.61  
Comparatively, the statutorily required contribution from 2011 to 
2015 was $17.7 billion.62  The total payments made by the Christie 
administration equaled $2.861 billion or 16% of the contribution 
required under N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c).63  In response to Governor 
Christie’s chronic underfunding of the pension system (and the 
underfunding of previous governors), state employees filed suit 
against the state in Burgos v. State of New Jersey.64 
D. Burgos v. State of New Jersey 
In 2014, the state contributed $696 million of the required $3.7 
billion ARC.65  Additionally, the state did not account for the 
requisite funding in the 2015 Appropriations Act submitted by 
Governor Christie and ratified by the New Jersey State Legislature.66  
Resultantly, state employees sued the state, arguing that the state 
failed to satisfy its contractual obligations under N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-
9.5(c).67  In response, the state did not dispute that it failed to satisfy 
its obligations under N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c), but argued that the 
requirements of N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c) violated the Debt 
Limitations Clause of the New Jersey Constitution, and therefore 
N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c) did not create a binding obligation on the 
 
(June 24, 2011)).  
 59  Id. (noting that 20,000 employees retired in 2010, an increase of 60% over 
2009).   
 60  TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE, supra note 24. 
 61  Mark Magyar, The Truth About N.J.’s Pension Crisis and How to Fix it, NJ.COM (Jan. 
5 2016), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2016/01/the_truth_about_njs_pensio 
n_ crisis_and_how_to_fix.html.  
 62  TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE, supra note 24. 
 63  TRUTH & CONSEQUENCE, supra note 24. 
 64  Burgos v. State of New Jersey, 118 A.3d 270, 274 (2015). 
 65  Id.  
 66  Id. at 290. 
 67  Id. at 274. 
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state to provide the specified funding.68  In other words, the state 
argued that a law passed and ratified by the current legislative 
regime violated the New Jersey Constitution, and therefore did not 
obligate the state to provide the requisite funding to the pension 
system. 
The employees argued that the state’s failure to provide the 
requisite funding violated the Contract Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.69  Under the Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 
states may not pass legislation that impairs the obligations of 
contracts.70  Additionally, the New Jersey Constitution provides: 
“the Legislature shall not pass any . . . law impairing the obligation 
of contracts, or depriving a party of any remedy for enforcing a 
contract which existed when the contract was made.”71  
Furthermore, “[l]egislation unconstitutionally impairs a contract 
when it (1) ‘substantially impair[s] a contractual relationship,’ (2) 
‘lack[s] a significant and legitimate public purpose,’ and (3) is ‘based 
upon unreasonable conditions and . . . unrelated to appropriate 
governmental objectives.”72  The critical question before the court, 
however, was not whether New Jersey substantially impaired a 
contractual relationship, but whether a binding contractual 
relationship existed at all.  To determine whether the 2011 reforms 
created an enforceable contract, the court evaluated two issues.  
First, did the Legislature speak with sufficient clarity to evince intent 
to create a contractual right?73  Second, did state law grant the 
Legislature the authority to enter into the binding and enforceable 
contract in question?74 
Addressing the question of whether the legislature clearly 
evinced intent to create a contractual right, the court concluded that 
the legislature and Governor Christie clearly expressed intent that 
the 2011 reforms create a contractual right to reduce the pension 
liabilities to safe levels.75  In particular, Governor Christie’s remarks 
in 2011 that, “[t]he [pension payment] schedule is codified into 
legislation we have right now and makes it a contractual right of 
folks in the pension system to have those payments made,” 
 
 68  See generally id. at 275–280. 
 69  Id. 
 70  U.S. CONST. art. I, §10, cl 1. 
 71  N.J. CONST. art. IV, §7, ¶ 3.  
 72  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 280.  
 73  San Diego Police Officers’ Ass’n v. San Diego City Emps.’ Ret. Sys., 568 F.3d 725, 
737 (9th Cir. 2009).  
 74  Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938).  
 75  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 282–83.  
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evidenced the legislature’s intent to create a contractual 
relationship.76  Thus, because a contractual right was created, the 
question that follows is whether the legislature had the authority to 
create the contractual relationship currently at issue.  Here, the 
Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that the legislature 
exceeded its authority and violated the Debt Limitation Clause of 
the New Jersey Constitution in passing Chapter 78, therefore 
invalidating any contractual relationship created by the 2011 
Pension Reform Amendments. 
The Debt Limitation Clause of the New Jersey Constitution 
states: 
The Legislature shall not, in any manner, create in any fiscal year a debt 
or debts, liability or liabilities of the State, which together any previous 
debts or liabilities shall exceed at any time one per centum of the total 
amount appropriated by the general appropriation law for that fiscal 
year, unless the same shall be authorized by a law for some object or 
work distinctly specified therein . . . . [N]o such law shall take effect until 
it shall be submitted to the people at a general election and approved by 
a majority of the legally qualified voters of the State voting thereon.77 
The court agreed with the state’s arguments and held that the 
legislature and the Governor did not have the authority to enact an 
enforceable, legally binding financial agreement through statute.78 
The court found that the “shall not . . . create in any fiscal year a debt 
or debts, liability or liabilities” language of Debt Limitations Clause 
prohibits the creation of debts or financial obligations of the state 
through statute, and further noted that efforts to create such 
obligations outside of the annual appropriations act will not have 
binding effect.79  In other words, irrespective of the contractual 
language of N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c), the Debt Limitations Clause 
renders the obligations of N.J.S.A. § 43:3C-9.5(c) a mere expression 
 
 76  See NJ Citizen Action Joins Pension Lawsuit, POLITICKER NJ (Apr. 28, 
2015), http://politickernj.com/2015/04/nj-citizen-action-joins-pension-lawsuit/; see 
also Mark J. Magyar, Sweeney Urges Pension Funding Overhaul to Reduce Impact on State 
Budget, NJ SPOTLIGHT (Oct. 28 2014), http://www.njspotlight.com/stories/14/10 
/28/sweeney-urges-pension-funding-overhaul-to-save-nj-s-troubled-plagued-system/ 
(noting legislative leader’s assertion that Chapter 78’s language expresses clear 
legislative intent to create contractual obligation). 
 77  N.J. CONST. art. VIII, §2, para. 3.  
 78  Burgos, 118 A.3d at 283. 
 79  Id.; see supra Part II (This holding was predictable in light of the NJEA decision 
where the New Jersey Supreme Court found that the language of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
18A:66-18(d) did not evidence the Legislature’s intent to create a contract. In NJEA, the 
court reached this conclusion in light of the statutory language, and the New Jersey 
Constitution’s Debt Limitations and Appropriations Clauses. The NJEA decision in 
effect, laid the foundation for the court’s ruling in Burgos. While the court in Burgos 
found that the statutory language clearly evinced the parties’ intent to create a contract, 
the Debt Limitations and Appropriations Clauses prevent such a holding.).  
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of the need to appropriate funds to alleviate the state’s pension 
liabilities, without the consequence of mandating that intent be 
satisfied through action in reality.  Thus, the legislature’s efforts in 
2011 and the governor’s signature and promises in enacting N.J.S.A. 
§ 43:3C-9.5(c) were made hollow when the state continued to 
underfund the pension funds and retirement systems. 
III. RESPONSE TO THE BURGOS DECISION: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
In response to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decision in 
Burgos, Democratic legislators introduced legislation that amends 
the New Jersey Constitution, mandating contributions to the state 
pension and retirement funds.80 
The proposed legislation amends Article VII of the New Jersey 
Constitution (adding Section IV), and amends the language of 
Article VIII, Section II, paragraphs 2 and 3.81  If passed, beginning in 
2017, New Jersey would be required to contribute 50% of the full 
annual contribution each year (until 2021), and an additional 
payment increasing by at least 12.5% of the full annual contribution 
required for each subsequent fiscal year until 2021.82  The state 
contributions would be required on a quarterly basis and must be 
at least 25% by August 1, 50% by November 1, 75% by February 1, 
and 100% by May 1 of the state fiscal year.83  Finally, the full annual 
contribution requirement would take effect in 2021 and would be 
required each year thereafter.84  Additionally, the Amendment to 
Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 2 states that “[n]o general 
appropriation law for a fiscal year will be enacted without including 
appropriations for the State contributions to each retirement system 
and pension fund for public employees administered by the 
State.”85 
While legislators cannot guarantee passage of the amendment, 
they are optimistic in its proactive effect.86  According to a Rutgers-
Eagleton poll released on February 29, 2016, 49% of voters support 
 
 80  Samantha Marcus, Sweeney’s Bold Play Could Trump Christie on N.J. Pensions, 
N.J.COM (December 7, 2015), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/12/sweeney 
_calls_for_constitutional_amendment_on_pens.html.  
 81  S. Res. 184, 216 Leg. at 2 (2015).  
 82  N.J. S. Res. 184, at 2, 30–42 (2015).  
 83  Con. Res. 118, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2015).  
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  Telephone interview with Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo (D-Hamilton), N.J. 
Assemblyman (March 18, 2016).  
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the proposed constitutional amendment.87  Additionally, both 
Assemblyman DeAngelo and Ciattarelli voiced their belief that the 
amendment would pass if placed on the November ballot.88  
However, even if the amendment does not pass, State Senator Jim 
Whelan (D-Atlantic County) stated that “[t]he constitutional 
amendment at least will get the unions back to the table.”89  Senator 
Whelan further noted that “the state’s public workers’ unions need 
a measure of good faith from the state,” and emphasized that any 
good will of the state was undermined when the unions agreed to 
higher payments only to have the state renege on its pledge for 
increased contributions in the last pension reform agreement.90 
A. Support for Constitutional Amendment 
On March 18, 2016, Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo, 
representing the 32nd Legislative District, provided a telephone 
interview to discuss ACR 3, the companion legislation to SCR 184.  
The legislation proposes an amendment to the New Jersey 
Constitution to require payments to state-administered retirement 
plans and creates enforcement mechanisms to ensure that the state 
satisfies its funding obligations.91  In the 32nd Legislative District, 
Assemblyman DeAngelo represents one of the state’s largest groups 
of public employees and is the assistant business manager for the 
IBEW Local Union 269.92 
In 2015, Assemblyman DeAngelo voiced his concern with the 
Burgos decision, calling the decision “a significant blow to middle-
class public employees, teachers and public safety workers.”93  
Assemblyman DeAngelo echoed public workers and the Democratic 
 
 87  Andrew George, Poll: N.J. Voters Split on Pension Amendment, Favor $15 Minimum 
Wage, NJBIZ.COM (March 1, 2016), http://www.njbiz.com/article/20160301/NJBIZ01 
/160309988/poll-nj-voters-split-on-pension-amendment-favor-15-minimum-wage 
(The same poll indicated that 40% of voters oppose the constitutional amendment, 
and 11% are unsure of their position on the issue).  
 88  Telephone Interview with Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo, supra note 86; 
Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville), N.J. Assemblyman, in 
Trenton, N.J. (March 14, 2016). 
 89  Paul Brubaker, New Jersey’s Pension Crisis Can be Fixed. Here’s How, NJ.COM (Dec. 
21, 2015, 9:21 AM), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/12/new_jerseys_ 
pension_crisis_can_be_fixed_heres_how.html.  
 90  Id.  
 91  See A. Res. 3, 216th Leg. (2015).  
 92  Telephone Interview with Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo, supra note 86.  
 93  News Release, Assembly Democrats, DeAngelo : Pension Decision Hurts Public 
Employees (June 9 2015),  available at http://www.assemblydems.com/Article.asp? 
ArticleID=9727. 
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Caucus following the Burgos decision, calling upon the governor 
and the legislature to pay its “fair share of the pension system.”94  
“Failure to do so,” according to Assemblyman DeAngelo, “will 
deepen the cracks in the foundation of our state budget and 
economy.”95  Finally, Assemblyman DeAngelo stated, “we must 
consider steps necessary to make the employer-employee agreement 
between government and employee binding when it comes to 
pension, benefits and compensation.”96  Assemblyman DeAngelo, 
joined by members of the Democratic Caucus, took the first step 
toward creating a binding agreement with the proposal of ACR 3 
and SCR 184. 
B. Issues with the Constitutional Amendment 
Critics of the legislation immediately voiced their concerns 
arguing that, given the relatively small portion of the populace 
benefiting from the constitutional amendment, an amendment is 
not proper place to fix the state’s growing pension crisis.97  
Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli is among the critics of the 
legislation.98  Assemblyman Ciattarelli provided an in-person 
interview at the State House on March 14, 2016 to discuss the 
proposed constitutional amendment and elaborate on his proposals 
for reform. 
Assemblyman Ciattarelli believes that, if passed, the proposed 
constitutional amendment will have disastrous consequences for 
the State of New Jersey, noting that even if the state made its ARC, 
the pension system would still be underfunded and in a precarious 
position.99  Assemblyman Ciattarelli pointed to three factors which 
contributed to the pension crisis: (1) the state’s failure to make the 
annual required contribution; (2) the unrealistic benefits promised 
to pensioners which, “simply put, were not and remain unrealistic” 
given the state of the pension system and the state budget; and (3) 
the healthcare benefits pensioners are entitled to which further 
burden the state budget.100  An amendment to the state constitution, 
according to Assemblyman Ciattarelli, does not fix a broken system.  
 
 94  Id. (Failure to [pay its fair share] will prove that the state’s budget is balanced 
squarely on the backs of public employees.”).  
 95  Id. 
 96  Id.  
 97  Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville), N.J. Assemblyman, 
in Trenton, N.J. (March 14, 2016). 
 98  Id.  
 99  Id.  
 100  Id. 
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Part of the support for the constitutional amendment is the theory 
that, if the state makes the annually required contribution, the 
unfunded liability will decrease because of cash infusion and a 
modest growth rate of 4%.  This position is supported by evidence 
in Michigan and West Virginia, in addition to consensus among 
pension analysts, which note that the best way to increase funding 
for a pension system is through larger contributions and the 
resultant investment growth.101  Assemblyman Ciattarelli responds 
by asking, “What happens if the growth rate fails to meet 
expectations?”102  This question is particularly relevant because the 
fiscal health of the system is determined by investment 
assumptions. 
While the system may improve if the growth rate meets 
expectations, the financial crisis of 2008 is an all too recent 
reminder of what happens when growth rates fail to meet 
expectations, or in some instances, result in investment losses.  
Assemblyman Ciattarelli vehemently supports state employees and 
their right to receive benefits, but notes the practical realities of the 
state’s financial situation.103  Simply put, a constitutional 
amendment may cause a cash infusion to the pension funds, but 
will not result in a return to adequate funding levels.  The 
amendment will, however, impose limitations to the state budget 
and in years where the state budget does not have the funds to satisfy 
the pension obligation, the inflexible constitutional provision will 
force either cuts to funding for other state programs or tax increases 
for what is already one of the most heavily taxed states in the 
country.104 
Assemblyman Ciattarelli offers an alternative solution to the 
“disastrous” constitutional amendment. Ciattarelli’s plan is 
predicated on three components: (1) change to a defined-
contribution plan; (2) municipal funding for a percentage of 
teacher’s pension benefits; and (3) pension healthcare benefit 
 
 101  See infra Part V.  
 102  Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville), N.J. Assemblyman, 
in Trenton, N.J. (March 14, 2016). 
 103  Id. 
 104  Erin Carlyle, The Best and Worst States for Taxes, FORBES.COM (April 15, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2015/04/15/the-best-and-worst-states-for-
taxes/#1d9ad584725c (New Jersey ranks as the second most taxed state in the country. 
New York is number 1, and neighboring Connecticut is number 3); Sandra Block, Worst 
States to Live in For Taxes, KIPLINGER.COM (September 2015), http://www. 
kiplinger.com/slideshow/taxes/T054-S001-least-tax-friendly-states-in-the-u-
s/index.html (According to Kiplinger, New Jersey is the third least tax friendly state in 
the country. New Jersey has the highest property taxes as well).  
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reform.105  The first component of Ciattarelli’s plan would require 
all newly hired teachers participate in a new defined-contribution 
401(k) plan, and all teachers with less than 10 years in the pension 
system would have their account switched to the defined-
contribution 401(k) plan.106  Part two of the Ciattarelli proposal is 
the most interesting and innovative component of his proposal. 
Ciattarelli suggests that all new hires would have their pension paid 
for by the local school district, not the State of New Jersey. 
Under Assemblyman Ciattarelli’s proposal, municipalities 
must fund at least 25% of the local school budget through local tax 
levies, and communities cannot abate school property taxes on new 
developments.107  This, according to Ciattarelli, would ensure 
fairness for funding of the pension system and taps into more stable 
funding source for the pension system: local property taxes.108  
Assemblyman Ciattarelli noted that the financial crisis of 2008 is 
among the reasons for the state’s pension liability increase.  The 
crisis affected pension investments; but, more importantly, it also 
impinged economic growth in the state. New Jersey’s portion of the 
pension contribution is derived from the state budget, and the 
budget’s primary funding source is the New Jersey sales and income 
tax.  Thus, when New Jersey’s economy struggled, state revenues 
suffered, and the state failed to make the appropriate pension 
contribution.  While the state’s failure to fund the pension system is 
not excusable according to Ciattarelli, the 2008 financial crisis 
identified a critical issue with our pension system: the financial 
health of the system is reliant upon a volatile source of funding.109  
Consequently, Assemblyman Ciattarelli’s proposition provides a 
funding mechanism tied to local property taxes—a large, stable 
revenue source. 
The third and final component of Assemblyman Ciattarelli’s 
plan addresses healthcare benefits to pensioners.110  The plan would 
 
 105  Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville), N.J. Assemblyman, 
in Trenton, N.J. (March 14, 2016). 
 106  Id. 
 107  Id.; Jack Ciattarelli, A Reform Plan to Solve Teachers Pension Problem, NJ.COM 
(August 27 2015), http://www.nj.com/opinion/index.ssf/2015/08/a_reform_plan_ 
to_solve_teachers_pension_problem_on.html (noting that presently some 
communities fund as little as 15% of their school budget, whereas others fund 90% of 
the local school budget).  
 108  Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville), N.J. Assemblyman, 
in Trenton, N.J. (March 14, 2016). 
 109  Id. 
 110  Id. 
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discontinue “Cadillac” health insurance plans for all newly hired 
teachers and all other participants at the end of the current 
contract.111  Additionally, if an employee’s pension salary and social 
security benefit exceeds $50,000 per year, they would not receive a 
reimbursement for Medicare B/Medicare gap payments.  
Furthermore, if an employee’s pension salary and social security 
benefit exceeds $30,000 per year, the employee would not receive a 
Medicare B reimbursement.112  At first blush, this component of the 
proposal is undesirable to current participants; however, 
Assemblyman Ciattarelli suggests that the savings would be passed 
on to the employees by decreasing their contribution to the fund, 
therefore increasing take-home pay.113  This pay could then be 
reinvested by the employee into supplemental health insurance to 
alleviate the loss of certain healthcare benefits, or the employee 
could spend the additional salary in any other way he or she 
chooses. 
Both the supporters and critics of New Jersey’s proposed 
constitutional amendment offer convincing arguments for their 
position.  The undisputed fact presented to pensioners, legislators, 
and New Jersey taxpayers is that the fiscal health of the pension 
system can and should not be ignored, and the decisions by 
previous administrations to underfund the system cannot continue.  
Part V of this note will analyze the sagacity of ACR 3 and SCR 184 
and the viability of Assemblyman Ciattarelli’s proposal.  To evaluate 
ACR 3 and SCR 184, this note looks to the seven states with 
Constitutional protection for pension benefits and the states that 
have changed from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution plan 
for an example and evidence to determine the most prudent road 
toward a fiscally sound pension system. 
IV. OTHER PUBLIC PENSION FUNDS 
Currently, seven states have provisions in their constitutions 
which explicitly provide protection for pension benefits.114  New 
York, Illinois, and Alaska’s Constitutions protect past and future 
benefits.115  Michigan, Louisiana, Arizona, and Hawaii provide 
 
 111  Id. 
 112  Id. 
 113  Id. 
 114  Liz Farmer, How Are Pensions Protected State-by-State?, GOVERNING THE STATES & 
LOCALITIES (January 28, 2014), http://www.governing.com/finance101/gov-pension-
protections-state-by-state.html.  
 115  Id.  
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protection for past benefits only.116  Additionally, Michigan, Alaska, 
and West Virginia switched from a defined-benefit to a defined-
contribution pension system to address their growing unfunded 
pension liability.  Part V evaluates the pension history of the New 
York, Michigan, Alaska, and West Virginia to help assess the viability 
of the proposed constitutional reforms in New Jersey. 
A. Michigan 
Michigan has three primary state pension systems: the Public 
School Employees’ Retirement System (“MPSERS”), State Police 
Retirement System (“MSPRS”), and the State Employees’ Retirement 
System (“MSERS”).117  Article IX, §24 of the Michigan Constitution 
provides, “the accrued financial benefits of each pension plan and 
retirement system of the state and its political subdivisions shall be 
a contractual obligation thereof which shall not be diminished or 
impaired thereby.”118  The language “accrued financial benefits” 
indicates protection for past or accrued benefits, but does not 
protect future benefits.  This distinction provides Michigan with the 
legislative flexibility to reform pension benefits so long as the 
reforms do not diminish accrued benefits.  Resultantly, Michigan 
has repeatedly enacted significant reforms in the past 20 years in an 
effort to reduce the unfunded liability and address financial state of 
the three state pension systems.119 
The first example of Michigan’s pension reform efforts occurred 
in 1996 with the passage of legislation which froze the defined-
benefit pension fund for new participants and created a defined-
contribution pension system for new and future hires.120  At the time 
of the 1996 reforms, Michigan had two main pension funds, MSERS 
and MPSERS.121  The funding ratio for both funds in 1996 was 
86.2% and the unfunded liability estimated at $6 billion.  
Additionally, in the eight years preceding the 1996 reforms, 
Michigan contributed at least 77% of its ARC and typically exceeded 
 
 116  Id.  
 117  Public Sector Retirement Systems Pension Fund Information, THE PEW CHARITABLE 
TRUSTS (2015), available at http://pewtrusts.org/m/media/assets/2015/07/state-
pension-data-excel-sheet-71415.xlsx. 
 118  MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 24. 
 119  Anthony Randazzo, Pension Reform Case Study: Michigan, Policy Study No. 434, 
REASON FOUNDATION 12 (Mar. 2014), http://reason.org/files/pension_reform_ 
michigan.pdf.  
 120  Id.  
 121  Id. (MSERS had 412,121 members in 1996. MPSERS had 101,567 members.).  
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the ARC to offset years where the ARC fell below 100%.122  The 1996 
reform had two primary features: (1) closing the MSERS defined-
benefit fund, thereby isolating the current participants and limiting 
the number of pensioners to those currently enrolled in the system; 
and (2) creating a defined-contribution system, with automatic 
enrollment for all new hires.123  The question following the reform 
is whether the shift from a defined-benefit to a defined-contribution 
plan preserved the fiscal health of the MSERS pension system. 
In 1996, the MSERS defined-benefit system had an unfunded 
liability of $0.5 billion and a funding ratio of 93.4%.124  By 2012, 
the unfunded liability was approximately $5.4 billion with a 
funding ratio of 65.5%.125  At first blush, the statistics appear to 
indicate that the shift to a defined contribution system did not 
preserve the fiscal health of the MSERS system.  In fact following the 
reform, Michigan systematically underfunded the system, failing to 
provide the requisite ARC and causing the drastic growth in 
unfunded liability.126  Despite the statistics, proponents of the 1996 
reform suggest that, absent the reform, the $5.4 billion unfunded 
liability would have increased and retirement benefit costs would 
have reached unsustainable levels.127  Analysis of the MPSERS 
indicates that individuals in that school of thought are likely correct. 
Unlike the MSERS defined-benefit system, the MPSERS system 
did not shift to a defined-contribution plan with the 1996 reforms.  
In 1996, MPSERS had an unfunded liability of $6 billion, and a 
funding ratio of 78.9%. By 2012, the funding ratio was 64.7% and 
the unfunded liability of $22.4 billion.128  The declining funding 
ratio of the MSERS defined-benefit system is product of a number 
of factors.  One of the factors is the change to a defined-contribution 
system because the number of employees contributing to the 
defined-benefit fund remained stagnant (or decreased) while 
benefits remained the same (or increased) with the growing life 
expectancy of retirees.  The MPSERS system, however, experienced a 
comparable decreased funding ratio even though the number of 
contributing employees continued to grow.  The explanation for the 
 
 122  Id. at 7.  
 123  Id. at 15.  
 124  Id. at 18. 
 125  Anthony Randazzo, Pension Reform Case Study: Michigan, Policy Study No. 434, 
REASON FOUNDATION 12 (Mar. 2014), http://reason.org/files/pension_reform_ 
michigan.pdf.  
 126  Id.  
 127  Id. 
 128  Id.  
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continued failure of MPSERS is a combination of economic factors 
and importantly financial mismanagement.  Thus, while both the 
MSERS and MPSERS systems suffered significant funding ratio 
decreases, the facts are inconclusive as to whether that the financial 
health of the MSERS system would be even worse had the Michigan 
legislature not enacted the 1996 reform shifting to a defined-
contribution plan.  The Mackinac Center for Public Policy estimates 
that the shift to defined-contribution plans saved taxpayers between 
$2.3 and $4.3 billion; however the experiences of West Virginia and 
Alaska, discussed below, suggest otherwise.129 
B. New York 
New York has three state-administered pension systems.  The 
primary systems are the New York State and Local Employees 
Retirement System (“ERS”), the New York State Teachers Retirement 
System (“NYSTRS”), and the New York State and Local Police and 
Fireman Retirement System (“PFRS”).130 
Since the reforms, New York’s funding and yearly ARC have 
continued to rank among the best in the nation.  However, a 
comparison from 2003 to 2013 does not tell the entire story 
regarding the state of New York’s pension system.  According to the 
Pew Charitable Trust, from 2004 to 2009, the assets of the New York 
pension system exceeded the total liability.  In other words, from 
2004 to 2009, New York’s pension system did not have an unfunded 
liability.  Notably, New York contributed 100% from 2003 to 
2013.131  Despite contributing 100% of the ARC and having a 
pension system with a funding ratio in excess of 100% from 2004 
to 2009, New York’s funding ratio decreased each year from 2009 to 
2013.  In 2013, New York’s unfunded pension liability was 
estimated at $20 billion and the funding ratio stood at 88.7%.132  
New York’s funding ratio has decreased from 99.4% in 2003 to 
88.7% in 2013.133  The decrease in funding ratio may be explained 
by the effect of the 2008 financial crisis on the investment returns 
 
 129  Mackinac Center for Public Research, Michigan’s Pension Underfunding Problem, 
MACKINAC.ORG (2015), https://www.mackinac.org/20884. 
 130  Center for Retirement Research, New York State Summary, BOSTON COLLEGE (Feb. 
2013), http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/New-York.pdf. 
 131  Id.  
 132  Public Sector Retirement Systems, The State Pensions Funding Gap: Challenges 
Persist, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (Jul. 31, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/ 
multimedia/data-visualizations/2015/the-fiscal-health-of-state-pension-plans#/ (New 
York’s funding ration ranked 6th nationally in 2013).  
 133  Id.  
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of the pension fund.  In response to the 2008 financial crisis, New 
York enacted pension reforms which increased employee 
contributions and invoked significant cuts to benefits for new 
hires.134  Employee contributions in ERS increased from 7% of 
payroll to 18%, NYSTRS increased from 7% to 13%, and PFRS 
increased from 14% to 25%.135  Additionally, all three systems 
increased the age and tenure required to receive benefits, increased 
the salary averaging periods, and reduced the benefit factor.136  The 
history of New York supports the position of Assemblyman 
Ciattarelli, which  points out that, even when a state makes 100% 
of its ARC, the funding ratio for the pension system continues to 
decrease.  This suggests that economic factors significantly affect the 
return on pension investments and, when the rate of return falls 
below predicted levels, the system will suffer—regardless of the 
state’s contribution.  That being said, failure to make an ARC 
guarantees an even greater unfunded liability, as demonstrated by 
New Jersey. 
C. West Virginia 
The West Virginia Teachers Retirement System (“TRS”) was 
significantly underfunded because the state failed to make the 
appropriate contributions.137  In 1991, West Virginia adopted a 
defined-contribution 401(k) plan to address the historical 
underfunding of the system and alleviate the burden of the 
unfunded liability.138  West Virginia closed the pre-existing defined 
benefit plan to new members, and new hires were placed in the 
defined-contribution plan.139  However, the change resulted in an 
increase in the unfunded obligation because the decreasing number 
of active teachers contributing to the fund could not offset the 
growing number of retired teachers still participating in the defined 
benefit plan.140  By 2005, the TRS distributed benefits to 
 
 134  Id.  
 135  Id.  
 136  Id.  
 137  National Institute on Retirement Security, Case Studies of State Pension Plans that 
Switched to Defined Contribution Plans 2 (Feb. 2015), http://www.rsa-al.gov/ 
uploads/files/Case_Studies_State_Pension_Plans_that_switched_to_DC_Plans.pdf.  
 138  Eli Lehrer & Steve Stanek, The State Public Pension Crisis: A 50 State Report Card 
24 (2010), available at http://www.legis.nd.gov/files/committees/63-2013nma/ 
appendices/gf073013appendixf.pdf?20160417231816. 
 139  Id.  
 140  National Institute on Retirement Security, Case Studies of State Pension Plans that 
Switched to Defined Contribution Plans 2 (Feb. 2015), http://www.rsa-al.gov/ 
uploads/files/Case_Studies_State_Pension_Plans_that_switched_to_DC_Plans.pdf.  
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approximately 27,000 active teachers, while less than 18,000 active 
teachers contributed to the fund.141 
Additionally, as of April 2005, members of the defined-
contribution plans discovered that the account balances would not 
provide adequate retirement income—while their defined-benefit 
counterparts experienced a return 1.6% greater than the average 
defined-contribution return.142  Resultantly, West Virginia decided 
to place new hires back in the defined contribution plan and 
permitted already participating defined-contribution members to 
opt-in to the defined-benefit plan.143  Most significantly, West 
Virginia exceeded the ARC between 2003 and 2013, including excess 
contributions of $290.1 million in 2006 and $1.2 billion in 2007.144  
As of 2013, West Virginia’s Teacher Retirement System was 58%—
an increase of 23% from 2005.145  The plan is expected to be fully 
funded by 2034.146 
The National Institute on Retirement Security suggests that the 
health of West Virginia’s system is a reflection of the switch back to 
a defined-benefit plan and indicates that changes to defined-
contribution plans increases retirement costs.147  While the timing 
of West Virginia’s return to a defined-benefit plan correlates with 
increased ARC payments, the National Institute on Retirement 
Security does not provide clear evidence that the change created 
additional revenue enabling the state to make its ARC payments.  
The situation in West Virginia may support this conclusion; however 
the critical takeaway from West Virginia is that when states satisfy 
100% of the ARC, the health of the pension system can improve. 
D. Alaska 
Alaska’s primary pension systems are the Public Employees’ 
Retirement System (“PERS”) and the Teachers’ Retirement and 
Pension System (“PRPS”).148  Unlike each of the states discussed in 
 
 141  Id.  
 142  Id.  
 143  Id. at 3.  
144    Id.  
 145  Id.  
 146  National Institute on Retirement Security, Case Studies of State Pension Plans that 
Switched to Defined Contribution Plans 3 (Feb. 2015), http://www.rsa-al.gov/ 
uploads/files/Case_Studies_State_Pension_Plans_that_switched_to_DC_Plans.pdf.  
 147  Id. at 4.  
 148  Alaska PERS/TRS Defined Contribution Retirement Plan, CENTER FOR RETIREMENT 
RESEARCH AT BOSTON COLLEGE (Apr. 2011), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/Alaska-2.pdf. 
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this section, and nearly every state in the nation, Alaska currently 
utilizes a defined contribution plan for participants in the public 
pension system.149  In 2005, Alaska instituted a mandatory defined 
contribution plan wherein employees contribute 8% of their salary, 
and employers contribute 5% for general employees and 7% for 
teachers.150  The change to a defined contribution plan was a 
response to the state’s $5.7 billion unfunded liability.151  Despite the 
shift to the defined-contribution plan, Alaska only contributed 47% 
of the ARC to PERS and 45% of the ARC to PRPS in 2005, thereby 
increasing the unfunded liability to $6.9 billion.152  By 2013, 
Alaska’s unfunded liability rose to approximately $9 billion and the 
system was 52.3% funded.153  Notably, the funding ratio for Alaska’s 
pension systems continued to decrease despite contributions of 
90.2% of its ARC in 2013 and at least 80% from 2008 to 2012.154 
In West Virginia, the clear correlation with the improving unfunded 
liability ratio lay with the excess ARC payments, which 
circumstantially corresponded to the return to a defined benefit 
plan.  Alaska’s situation, however, provides concrete evidence that a 
switch to a defined-contribution plan leads to immediate increased 
pension costs. From 2008 to 2012, Alaska contributed at least 80% 
of the ARC, yet the pension liability increased by $2.1 billion.  
Additionally, any increase in liability resulting from the financial 
crisis of 2008 should have been offset by the market recovery from 
2009 to 2013, yet this was not the case in Alaska.  Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that the source of the increased liabilities is a 
product of the decreased employee contributions resulting from the 
closure of the defined-benefit plan—implying that the defined-
contribution plan at a minimum increases short-term pension costs, 
and potentially causes additional damage to the financial state of 
the pension fund. 
 
 
 
 149  Id.  
 150  Id.  
 151  National Institute on Retirement Security, Case Studies of State Pension Plans that 
Switched to Defined Contribution Plans 9 (Feb. 2015), http://www.rsa-al.gov/ 
uploads/files/Case_Studies_State_Pension_Plans_that_switched_to_DC_Plans.pdf.  
 152  Id. 
 153  The Fiscal Health of State Pension Plans, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS (July 31, 
2015), available at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2015 
/the-fiscal-health-of-state-pension-plans.  
 154  Id. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT AND PROPOSED 
SOLUTIONS 
A. Constitutional Provisions: What is the Effect? 
Based on the overview of Michigan, New York, and Alaska, 
whose State Constitutions explicitly provide protection to 
employees by requiring funding of pension systems, it appears that 
enacting a constitutional provision has mixed, unconvincing results.  
Each of the seven states with constitutional protections contributed 
at least 75% of the ARC in 2013 and contributed at least 70% each 
year since the 2008 financial crisis.155  This figure is unsurprising as 
constitutional protections for pension funding would have a direct 
correlation to consistent ARC payments, because a failure to satisfy 
this obligation would likely constitute a violation of the state 
constitution and in many cases would explicitly implicate a 
constitutionally protected contract right.  However, the state-by-
state analysis above clearly demonstrates that satisfaction of ARC 
payment requirements is not necessarily an indicator of a healthy 
state pension system.  Of the seven states with constitutional 
protection, four states were less than 60% funded, and six of the 
seven states fell below the 80% threshold for a healthy pension 
system.156  Additionally, and of greater significance, the funding 
ratio for five of the seven states has continued to decrease each year, 
an indicator that the pension systems continue to struggle in spite 
of constitutional protections.157 
While the Spina decision discussed in Part II laid the foundation 
for the New Jersey judiciary’s review of future pension challenges, it 
also valuable for evaluating the current state of the New Jersey 
pension systems.  The reality of defined benefit plans is that the 
benefits promised to pensioners and the legislation passed to help 
secure those benefits only postpone future pension crises.158  As the 
Spina court noted in 1964, 
all these [pension] funds had in common [is] the promise of inevitable 
doom. The reason was that the annual revenues were not related to the 
ultimate cost of pension benefits, so that while current income might 
suffice for the earlier pensioners, the day had come when little or nothing 
would remain for others, even of their own contributions to the fund. 
Accordingly, there were periodic crises, in connection with which long-
range solutions were offered, only to be rejected in favor of something 
 
 155  See supra Part III.  
 156  See supra Part III.  
 157  See supra Part III. 
 158  Spina, 197 A.2d at 393. 
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more palatable for the moment.159 
An amendment guaranteeing pension payments in the New 
Jersey Constitution is another example of the “something more 
palatable for the moment,” ignoring the need for a long-range 
solution. 
A constitutionally guaranteed pension payment in the New 
Jersey Constitution would protect the funding of the severely 
underfunded pension system; however, the practical effect of such 
an amendment is either (1) slashing of funding for other state 
programs, or (2) significant tax increases for what is already the 
most heavily taxed state in the nation.  As Michael Bloomberg, 
former Mayor of New York City, stated in 2008, “New York City is 
spending so much money on pensions . . . that we have far less to 
spend on core services, such as public safety, education, parks, and 
senior centers.”160  Mayor Bloomberg’s statements are illustrative of 
the problem currently facing New Jersey and the disaster that would 
be posed by a constitutional amendment requiring annual pension 
payments.  Additionally, New York State’s pension system has 
contributed 100% of its ARC and continues to see its funding ratio 
decrease.161  While it is critical for New Jersey to make its annual 
contributions, imposing a constitutional restriction on future 
pension reform is not the solution.  Presently, “there is no state in 
the Union that has enshrined public pension payments into its state 
constitution.”162  It is imperative that New Jersey not be the first. 
B. Hybrid Defined Benefit–Defined Contribution System 
One of the most common ideas that emerge in pension reform 
discussions is transitioning from defined-benefit to defined-
contribution plans.  Assemblyman Ciattarelli cited a transition to a 
defined-contribution plan as one of the components of his 
proposed pension reform.163  While the issues facing New Jersey’s 
pension system are not identical to those facing other states, an 
analysis of states that have shifted to a defined contribution plan 
may illustrate the merits of defined contribution plans for public 
 
 159  Id. at 394.  
 160  Michael Bloomberg, Why Pension Reform Is Fair & Vital, NEW YORK POST, Dec. 18, 
2008, http://www.nypost.com/seven/12182008/postopinion/opedcolumnists/ why_ 
pension_reform_is_fair_vital_144747.htm.  
 161  See supra Part IV.  
 162  Alfred Doblin, A Public Pension is Not a Constitutional Right, NORTHJERSEY.COM 
(Jan. 11 2016, 9:31 AM), http://www.northjersey.com/opinion/a-public-pension-is-
not-a-constitutional-right-1.1489107.  
 163  Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli, supra note 97. 
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employees.  Defined-contribution systems are favored in certain 
jurisdictions because it alleviates pressure on state budgets and 
taxpayers that are responsible for the increased liability emerging 
from missed investment targets or longer benefit payments resulting 
from increased life expectancy.164  However, the experience of 
Michigan, West Virginia, and Alaska suggest that a defined-
contribution plan is not a viable option.165  Additionally, a report 
published by the Keystone Research Center suggests that a switch to 
a defined benefit plan would increase New Jersey’s unfunded 
liability.166  Many factors contribute to the fiscal health of a pension 
system; however, projecting increased costs resulting from a 
defined-benefit to a defined-contribution plan is straight forward.  
“Pension fund managers rely on investment returns to pay for two-
thirds of retirement benefits—twice the amount covered by 
employer and employee contributions combined.”167  Thus, closing 
a defined contribution plan cuts off the additional funds 
contributed by new employees, while vested employees retire and 
cease making their salary based contributions to the system.  This, 
in effect, increases the unfunded liability of the pre-existing defined-
benefit plan by reducing the overall rate of return, while 
simultaneously requiring contributions to the new defined-benefit 
plan.  Quite simply, a standalone defined-contribution plan would 
decrease costs, but a transition to a defined-contribution plan does 
not remove New Jersey’s pre-existing defined-benefit obligations to 
vested retirees. 
C. Proposed Solution and Conclusion 
In 2016, New Jersey’s unfunded liability pension liability was 
estimated at $55 billion.168  The liability has increased each of the 
past ten years and continues to be neglected.  New Jersey enacted 
comprehensive pension reform in 2011, increasing employee 
contributions, increasing the retirement age, diminishing healthcare 
benefits, and eliminating cost of living adjustments.169  The reform 
 
 164  Randazzo, supra note 13. 
 165  See supra Part IV.  
 166  See Stephen Herzenberg, How to Dig an Even Deeper Pension Hole, KEYSTONE 
RESEARCH CENTER (Oct. 2014), available at http://njpp.org/assets/reports/NJPPKRC 
PensionsOct2014.pdf.  
 167  Id. at 3.  
 168  Samantha Marcus, Losing Pension Court Case Could Cost N.J. Big, Moody’s Warns, 
NJ.COM (Jan. 21 2016), http://www.nj.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/01/losing_state_ 
supreme_court_pension_case_could_cost.html.  
 169  See supra Part II.  
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was recognized both in New Jersey and throughout the country as 
an example of bi-partisan compromise to fix one of the nation’s 
worst pension systems.  Despite the 2011 reforms, the state has 
failed to live up to its end of the bargain, contributing 18.6% of its 
ARC, the worst in the nation.170  The state’s failure to make its annual 
contribution has further damaged an already broken system and 
continues the habitual “kicking of the can” for future legislators and 
taxpayers to deal with.  Blame can be attributed to both sides; 
however, the debates over responsibility only ignore the practical 
reality: the system continues to head toward the brink of disaster 
and the any solution will require leadership in both parties. 
Assemblyman DeAngelo co-sponsored ACR 3, which would 
amend the New Jersey Constitution and force the Republican 
administration to makes its ARC.  The amendment would make 
New Jersey the first state in the nation to provide constitutional 
protection for pension payments.171  A constitutional amendment is 
a dramatic measure; however, Assemblyman DeAngelo points to the 
state’s continual underfunding of the system and unfulfilled 
promises from 2011.  From Assemblyman DeAngelo’s perspective, 
additional compromise is unrealistic’ because the current 
administration has “eroded any goodwill” they had at the 
negotiating table.172  Finally, Assemblyman DeAngelo suggests that 
the money for the ARC is in the budget, yet the current 
administration refuses to appropriate the funds for the ARC.173  The 
constitutional amendment forces the state’s hand and will move the 
system on the path to recovery. 
Contrary to Assemblyman DeAngelo’s position, Assemblyman 
Ciattarelli calls the proposed constitutional amendment a 
catastrophic error, which will place unnecessary constraints on the 
 
 170  Elise Young, N.J.’s 18.6% Pension Funding Least in U.S., Moody’s Finds, 
BLOOMBERG.COM (Jan. 15, 2016), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-
15/n-j-s-18-6-pension-funding-least-in-u-s-moody-s-finds. 
 171  New York’s, Michigan’s, Alaska’s, Arizona’s, Hawaii’s, Illinois’, and Louisiana’s 
constitutions protect certain pension benefits from being diminished or reduced, but 
do not constitutionally mandate the state to make its ARC. See Stephen Eide, 
Constitutional Public Pension Guarantees: Unfair, Unaffordable, and Bad Policy, MANHATTAN 
INSTITUTE FOR POLICY RESEARCH (Aug. 2013), http://www.manhattan-institute.org/ 
pdf/ib_25.pdf.  
 172  Telephone Interview with Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo, supra note 86 
(Assemblyman DeAngelo said that there have not been any discussions with the 
Republican leadership regarding future reforms or any prospective discussions on the 
subject. Assemblyman DeAngelo advised that current plan is to wait on the voters’ 
decision regarding the pension amendment).  
 173  Telephone Interview with Assemblyman Wayne DeAngelo, supra note 86. 
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legislature in years when investment returns fall below projections.  
In years where projections fall short, the state would be responsible 
for the ARC, in addition to the funding shortfall resulting from poor 
returns.  As Governor Christie noted, “education, health care, crime, 
our environment, support for the poor, [and] protection for our 
children . . . would all be subject to elimination to pay for the 
pensions of 800,000 current and former employees.”174  This 
statement may stretch the truth, but it also points out the reality of 
our financial situation: the pension system’s funding problem is not 
solved by the state making its ARC, and a constitutional amendment 
will only serve to bind the state to an obligation which will have 
calamitous effects on funding for critical areas, or may further 
burden the taxpayers.  Assemblyman Ciattarelli echoes this 
sentiment arguing that placing additional fiscal constraints on the 
budget, while potentially increasing budgetary obligations, will lead 
to either significant cuts to funding for critical state programs or shift 
the burden to the backs of taxpayers.175  Recognizing each of these 
positions, the practical solution falls at the intersection of both 
Assemblyman DeAngelo’s amendment and Assemblyman 
Ciattarelli’s proposal. 
The proposed constitutional amendment, while a drastic 
measure, seems imperative given the years of irresponsible financial 
management of our pension system.  In particular, Governor 
Christie’s decision to renege on the promises of 2011 and deflect 
blame to pensioners and the Democratic leadership suggests that, 
absent a different administration, good faith negotiations are 
unlikely.  That said, obligating the state to constitutionally 
mandated funding sets the stage for future disaster.  The alternative 
proposal is comprised of constitutional protections comparable to 
those provided by Michigan, Louisiana, Arizona and Hawaii.  Each 
state’s constitution protects past or accrued benefits, but does not 
guarantee future benefits.176  Additionally, to alleviate the concerns 
of pensioners, the state would obligate itself to fund the pension 
system to guarantee the future benefits and those already accrued 
through an ARC. 
In exchange for an amendment which protects future benefits 
 
 174  Robert Steyer, Gov. Christie Derides Plan for New Jersey Constitutional Amendment 
on Pension Contributions, PIONLINE.COM (January 12 2016), http://www.pionline.com/ 
article/20160112/ONLINE/160119952/gov-christie-derides-plan-for-new-jersey-
constitutional-amendment-on-pension-contributions . 
 175 Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli, supra note 97. 
 176 See supra Part III.  
STEARNS_FINAL_FORMAT.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 8/23/2016  11:13 PM 
382 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 40:2 
and guarantees a constitutionally protected ARC, two components 
of Assemblyman Ciattarelli’s plan should be accepted to increase 
funding and offset a portion of the state’s obligation.  First, the state 
should adopt the proposed healthcare cuts—in particular the 
elimination of “Cadillac healthcare” plans.177  This proposal is 
controversial because it decreases healthcare benefits, however the 
benefits provided already exceed what is necessary, and the savings 
by decreasing benefits would (1) provide additional funding for the 
pension system, and (2) could be provided in the form of increased 
salary to pension participants whose salary contribution would 
decrease as well.178  The increased take-home pay for pension 
participants could then be reinvested in supplemental healthcare, or 
spent in anyway desired.  Second, the state should adopt the funding 
proposal whereby no community is permitted to fund less than 25% 
of their local school budget through the local tax levy, and 
communities cannot abate school property taxes on new 
developments.179  Shifting a portion of the funding burden to 
municipalities guarantees funding through property taxes—a stable 
funding option, not directly tied to the state’s economic health—
and resultantly provides additional funding for the pension system 
through the decreased funding provided to certain school districts.  
This portion of the proposal would provide equitable distribution 
for school funding throughout the state and would alleviate the new 
burden on the state budget through the constitutional amendment. 
The proposal above seeks to recognize the goals of each side of 
the pension debate and offer a compromise that serves both 
pensioners and taxpayers.  However, a perfect solution to New 
Jersey’s pension crisis does not exist. The proposed constitutional 
amendment in ACR 3 and SCR 184 is an imperfect response, but the 
inaction of the current administration and continued neglect for the 
pension system is an even greater calamity.  Ignoring the problem 
created the $55 billion unfunded liability and similar behavior only 
serves to further harm every citizen of the state.  The time has come 
for inaction to stop.  Only through the collective efforts of everyone 
involved can New Jersey stave off the impending fiscal disaster and 
hopefully preserve everyone’s financial future. 
 
 
 177 Interview with Assemblyman Jack Ciattarelli (R-Somerville), N.J. Assemblyman, 
in Trenton, N.J. (March 14, 2016). 
 178  Id. 
 179  Id.  
